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We analyze the e⁄ects of accidents and liability obligations on the incentives
of car manufacturers to monopolize the markets for their spare parts. We show
that monopolized markets for spare parts lead to higher overall expenditures for
consumers. Furthermore, while the manufacturers invest more in order to o⁄er cars
with higher qualities, monopolization tends to reduce social welfare. Key for these
results is the observation that high prices for spare parts entail a negative external
e⁄ect inasmuch as liability obligations imply that consumers of competing products
have to pay the high prices as well.
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1 1 Introduction
The optimal extent of design protection has been extensively discussed during the last
years. This is especially true for the protection of spare parts for motor vehicles. ￿ Must-
match￿restrictions with respect to the exact look of visible spare parts in combination
with strict design protection imply that car manufacturers and their component suppli-
ers have almost perfect monopoly power for visible replacement parts. Concerning the
economic e⁄ects of such consequences, there are essentially two di⁄erent views. First,
monopoly power due to design protection should be evaluated in the same manner as
patent protection for innovations. Furthermore, applying the Chicago argument that
there is only one monopoly rent leads to the conclusion that monopoly power on sec-
ondary markets is not detrimental for social welfare.1 According to the second view this
conclusion is, however, premature. Monopoly power on secondary markets may well lead
to additional distortions and may thus increase allocative ine¢ ciencies.
The actual policy in the European Union seems to follow the second line of reasoning.
Based on the Design Directive of 1998 (Directive 98/71/EC) and the proposal for the
amendment on that Directive of September 2004 (COM (2004) 582 ￿nal), the parliament
of the European Union backed a proposed directive which aims at liberalizing secondary
markets for spare parts in December 2007. The proposed directive limits design protection
for visible parts to primary markets by referring to a ￿ repair clause￿ . This clause allows
competitive suppliers to produce spare parts for secondary markets, i.e., markets for
repair and maintenance services. Thus, design protection is to be reduced such that
market entry and competition on secondary markets is possible.
The model presented in this paper supports the approach taken by the European Union.
The focus of our model is on the possibility that consumers, i.e. car drivers, cause acci-
dents with other cars and that they are reliable for the entailed damage. Analyzing the
implied economic e⁄ects shows that car manufacturers have in fact strong incentives to
monopolize the markets for their spare parts: monopolized markets for spare parts lead
to higher overall expenditures for consumers. Although the manufacturers have stronger
incentives to choose high qualities, monopolized markets for spare parts nevertheless tend
to increase the manufacturers￿pro￿ts. On the other hand, social welfare tends to be lower
1See Posner (1976) and Bork (1978).
2with monopolized markets. More speci￿cally, social welfare is always lower with monop-
olized markets for spare parts if primary markets for cars are covered and if costs for
producing spare parts are relatively high.
Key for these results is the observation that high prices for spare parts do not only harm
a manufacturer￿ s own consumers but also entail a negative external e⁄ect for other con-
sumers. With strictly positive probabilities of causing accidents, high prices for spare
parts increase expected expenditures for all consumers. Using this correlation, each man-
ufacturer has an incentive to choose rather high prices for spare parts but relatively low
prices for cars. By increasing the relation between the prices for spare parts and cars each
manufacturer can increase his own market share without lowering the overall revenue he
gets from his customers. In contrast to the simple Chicago school argument the relation
between the prices for spare parts and cars is therefore not neutral with respect to the
manufacturers￿market shares. Furthermore, the intensity of competition between manu-
facturers is reduced when markets for spare parts are monopolized. Since high prices for
spare parts have to be paid by all consumers who cause accidents, each manufacturers￿
demand is relatively inelastic with respect to his price for spare parts. Overall it turns
out that monopolized markets for spare parts lead to less intense competition between
manufacturers.
In contrast to main parts of the literature on secondary markets, these results are based
on external e⁄ects. While we assume that consumers are locked-in with respect to the
possible choices of spare parts, we also assume that consumers have perfect foresight
and that there are no commitment problems concerning future prices. More precisely, we
analyze a simple three stage game where two manufacturers choose the qualities of their
cars ￿rst. In the second stage, the manufacturers decide on their prices for cars and spare
parts. Consumers decide in the third stage. Their decisions are based on the (given)
prices and the overall expenditures they expect to incur if they buy a car. Expected
expenditures comprise the price for the car bought as well as expected payments due to
accidents caused. For simplicity, we assume that consumers always replace broken parts.
This setting does not entail any aspect of price discrimination between consumers who dif-
fer with respect to their willingness to pay (see for example Chen et al. (1993) and Emch
(2003)). Furthermore, with perfect foresight of consumers manufacturers cannot econo-
mize on lock-in e⁄ects or information costs (see Borenstein et al. (1995); Shapiro (1995)
3provides a critical discussion of monopolization incentives based on information costs).
Our assumption that all prices are chosen in the second stage rules out any commitment
problem (see Blair and Herndorn (1996)). Additionally there is no imperfect information
with respect to the manufacturers￿qualities (see Schwarz and Werden (1996) who show
that tying of goods and service in combination with low prices for services can be used
to signal high qualities).
Our results concerning social welfare are contrary to the ￿ndings of Carlton and Wald-
man (2006). Their approach focuses on durable goods in conjunction with maintenance,
remanufactured parts and product improvements. Carlton and Waldman show that in
all these cases monopolization of the respective aftermarkets can enhance e¢ ciency. In
contrast to competitive markets, monopolization allows for pricing structures that resem-
ble Ramsey prices and thus lead to more e¢ cient allocations when maintenance versus
replacement decisions or the purchase of either improved or upgraded products are ana-
lyzed. In the case of remanufactured parts, competition may harm social welfare because
of potential cost disadvantages of competing suppliers. Compared to the models analyzed
by Carlton and Waldman our model is much simpler, because we assume that demand for
spare parts is completely inelastic. Moreover, our model does not contain any dynamic
aspects with respect to future quality improvements.
In the following, we ￿rst describe the model. Section 3 focuses on the relation between
the prices for cars and spare parts and the induced e⁄ects on the manufacturers￿market
shares. Pricing decisions are analyzed in section 4, while quality decisions are discussed
in section 5. Using two speci￿c examples, we illustrate our results in section 6 where we
also consider social welfare. The ￿nal section concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a rather simple model with two ￿rms i = 1;2 producing cars of type 1 and 2.
Both ￿rms can choose the qualities qi and the prices pi for their cars. To incorporate the
possibility of accidents and to analyze the resulting demand for spare parts, we assume
that each accident leads to the same damage. This allows us to restrict the analysis to just
one spare part, the price of which is denoted by e pi with i = 1;2. Considering the markets
for spare parts, we will compare the case in which e p1 and e p2 can be chosen by ￿rm 1
4and 2 with the case where these prices are determined by competitive suppliers using the
same technologies as ￿rms 1 and 2. Finally, we assume that both ￿rms have the same
marginal cost functions c(qi) and e c(qi) for producing cars and spare parts, respectively.
Marginal costs are increasing and strictly convex in qualities, i.e., c0(qi);e c0(qi) > 0 and
c00(qi);e c00(qi) > 0. Additionally, we make the natural assumption that c(qi) > e c(qi) and
c0(qi) ￿ e c0(qi).
There is a continuum of consumers the number of which is normalized to one. Further-
more, we assume that the ￿rms￿cars are imperfect substitutes and that the (aggregate)
demand functions for both types of cars are the same. Letting mi denote the overall ex-
pected expenditures which consumers have to incur if they buy a type i car, consumers￿
demand Di for type i cars is given by (i;j = 1;2;i 6= j )2


















Overall expected expenditures mi are determined by the price pi as well as the prices e p1
and e p2 in combination with the probabilities that a consumer causes an accident. Each
consumer who has bought a car may cause two di⁄erent kinds of accidents. First, there
are accidents where no other cars are involved, second the consumer can cause accidents
with other cars. We assume that accidents are independent events which implies that
the expected number of accidents caused with other cars is linearly increasing in the
number of cars sold. Finally, we assume that consumers always replace broken parts and
that they are liable for damages caused to other cars. Let ￿ ￿ 0 denote the probability
that a consumer causes an accident where no other car is involved and let ￿ ￿ 0 denote
the probability that a consumer causes an accident with another car of either type.
Furthermore, let xi denote the quantity of type i cars which have actually been sold.
Then, total expected expenditures mi for buying a car of type i can be written as
mi(￿) = pi + ￿b pi + ￿i(b pi; b pj;xi;xj) with b pi := minfpi; e pig (3)
where : ￿i(￿) = 2￿b pixi + (b pi + b pj)￿xj denotes the expected payments (4)
: due to accidents caused with other cars
2In order to simplify the notation we omit the arguments of the functions where this does not lead
to any confusion.
5Note that (4) is based on the assumption that accidents lead to damages on all cars
involved and that spare parts are incompatible. Note further that a consumer would buy
a new car instead of the spare part if e pi > pi. Since we also have c(qi) > e c(qi), it is never
optimal for a ￿rm to choose e pi > pi.
Combining (1) and (3) and restricting the further analysis to e pi ￿ pi, ￿rms￿demand
functions Xi(pi;pj; e pi; e pj) for cars are implicitly given by
X1(￿) ￿ D1(p1 + ￿e p1 + ￿1(￿;X1(￿);X2(￿));p2 + ￿e p2 + ￿2(￿;X2(￿);X1(￿));￿) (5)
X2(￿) ￿ D2(p2 + ￿e p2 + ￿2(￿;X2(￿);X1(￿));p1 + ￿e p1 + ￿1(￿;X1(￿);X2(￿));￿) (6)
whereas expected demand e Xi(pi;pj; e pi; e pj) for spare parts can be written as
e X1(￿) = ￿X1(￿) + ￿1(X1(￿);X2(￿)) (7)
e X2(￿) = ￿X2(￿) + ￿2(X2(￿);X1(￿)) (8)
with : ￿i(￿) = Xi(￿)[2￿Xi(￿) + 2￿Xj(￿)]. (9)
Employing (5)￿ (8) and the assumptions on the ￿rms￿costs leads to the following ex-
pressions for the ￿rms￿pro￿ts ￿1(￿) and ￿2(￿)
￿1(￿) = (p1 ￿ c(q1))X1(￿) + (e p1 ￿ e c(q1)) e X1(￿) (10)
￿2(￿) = (p2 ￿ c(q2))X2(￿) + (e p2 ￿ e c(q2)) e X2(￿). (11)
We will analyze a three stage game where ￿rms ￿rst decide on their qualities. In the
second stage ￿rms choose their prices while demand and pro￿ts are realized in the last
stage. We assume perfect information and simultaneous decisions in all stages and solve
the game by backward induction.
3 Prices and market shares
Before turning to the ￿rms￿pricing decisions let us ￿rst consider the impact which ac-
cidents and liability obligations have on consumers￿demand and ￿rms￿market shares.
Focusing on the relation between pi and e pi and assuming ￿ = 0 and thus ￿i(￿) = 0,
￿rms￿demand functions are given by Xi(￿) = Di(pi +￿e pi;pj +￿e pi;￿) and e Xi(￿) = ￿Xi(￿).
Therefore, the standard Chicago school argument applies because consumers￿demand
6depends only on the weighted sum of prices. The relation between pi and e pi has no e⁄ect
on demand and thus on the ￿rms￿pro￿ts.
However, taking into account that consumers have to pay the damages they may have
caused to other consumers, it turns out that the relation between pi and e pi plays a crucial
rule for the ￿rms￿market shares. To see this more precisely, assume ￿ > 0 and consider
a change in pi and e pi with e pi < pi such that overall expenditures of consumers who buy
type i cars remain constant. That is, let pk
i (e pi;￿) be de￿ned such that
mi(￿) = pk
i (e pi;￿) + ￿e pi + ￿i(e pi; e pj;X1(￿);X2(￿)) = const: (12)
Using pk
i (e pi;￿) and evaluating the change in the ￿rms￿demands if e pi is varied leads to
the following proposition
Proposition 1 Starting from e pi < pi and changing e pi and pi such that total expenditures
mi(￿) remain constant, the market share of ￿rm i increases with e pi while the market share
of ￿rm j decreases as long as
1 ￿ ￿
￿









Proof. Using (12), the partial derivative of pk























Employing (13), using (5) and (6) as well as the implicit function theorem to calculate

































where ￿ is given by











Using (4) we get
@￿j(￿)
@e pi
= ￿Xj(￿) and ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿
￿








7The intuitive explanation for proposition 1 is based on the observation that an increase in
e pi also leads to higher expected expenditures for consumers who buy type j cars. Hence,
assuming ￿ > 0, increasing e pi and adapting pi such that expected expenditures mi(￿)
remain constant implies that type j cars become relatively more expensive. Therefore,
the market share of ￿rm i increases while the market share of ￿rm j decreases. In other
words, low prices for cars but high prices for spare parts ensure a competitive advantage
as far as market shares are concerned. This is especially true, if symmetric prices are
considered:
Corollary 1 With @Di(￿)/@mj(￿) ￿ j@Dj(￿)/@mj(￿)j and symmetric prices, i.e. e pi = e pj
with pi > e pi, increasing e pi and decreasing pi such that that total expenditures mi(￿) remain
constant leads to a higher market share of ￿rm i.
4 Firms￿pricing decisions
In the following, we will ￿rst analyze the ￿rms￿pricing decisions if markets for spare parts
are monopolized, i.e., if ￿rms can decide on both the price of their cars as well the price
of their spare parts. We show that the economic reasoning which leads to proposition 1
can also be applied to the ￿rms￿pricing strategies. That is, in a symmetric equilibrium
￿rms will choose their prices such that pi = e pi.
We will then turn to the case where markets for spare parts are perfectly competitive,
i.e., where we have e pi = e c(￿). Comparing the two regimes and assuming covered markets
shows that monopolized markets for spare parts lead to higher overall expenditures for
consumers.
Assuming that markets for spare parts are monopolized and using the same approach as
employed for proposition 1, equal prices for cars and spare parts are optimal if
d￿i(pk














i (e pi;￿) ￿ e pi. Evaluating (18) and focusing on symmetric situations, i.e., pi = pj;
e pi = e pj and qi = qj, we obtain the following lemma












any symmetric equilibrium implies pi = pj = e pi = e pj.
Proof. Starting with pk
i (e pi;￿) ￿ e pi, using (14)￿ (15) and simplifying (18) by employing
symmetry as well as (4) and (9) we get
d￿i(pk





























i (e pi;￿); e pi;￿)
￿
de pi = 0 for pk
i (e pi;￿) and substituting the solution into ￿i(￿)
reveals that any prices pk
i (e pi;￿) > e pi that satisfy d￿i(pk
i (e pi;￿); e pi;￿)
￿
de pi = 0 and e pi ￿ 0
lead to negative pro￿ts ￿i(￿) as long as @Di(￿)/@mj(￿) ￿ j@Di(￿)/@mi(￿)j. Similarly,
assuming e pi = 0 and solving @￿i(￿)/@pi = 0 for pi we get @￿i(￿)/@e pi > 0. Together
these results imply that we must have pi = pj = e pi = e pj in any symmetric equilibrium.
Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 are based on the same economic reasoning. While an increase
in e pi may lower overall demand, this negative e⁄ect can be compensated by reducing pi
such that the positive e⁄ects due to an increased market share dominate.
Applying lemma 1 and focusing again on symmetric equilibria, the ￿rms￿maximization
problem can be written as
max
pi
￿i(￿) = (pi ￿ c(qi))Xi(￿) + (pi ￿ e c(qi))[￿Xi(￿) + ￿i(Xi(￿);Xj(￿))] (20)
Solving the ￿rst-order condition aligned with (20) shows that the equilibrium price
p￿(qi;qj;￿) in any symmetric equilibrium with qi = qj is implicitly given by






1 + ￿ +
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9While (21) does not allow a straightforward interpretation, it indicates that there are two
major factors which determine the ￿rms￿pricing decisions. First and the most obvious,
with pi = e pi the relevant price-cost margin depends on the cost for cars as well as the
cost for spare parts (see the LHS of (21)). Second, ￿rms have to take into account that
demand for cars and spare parts are closely related not only to the ￿rms￿prices but also
to their market shares. This fact is captured by the last term on the RHS of (21) where
￿2 represents the change in the demand for spare parts if the ￿rms increase their prices.
Turning to the case in which spare parts can be o⁄ered competitively, ￿rms￿pro￿ts ￿i
simplify to (in the following the superscript c serves to indicate competitive markets for
spare parts)
￿c
i(￿) = (pi ￿ c(qi))Xc
i (￿) (22)
where Xc
i (￿) is given by (5) or (6) evaluated at e pi = e c(￿). Di⁄erentiating (22) with respect


















Combining (20), (21) and (23) in order to compare overall expenditures with and without
competition in the markets for spare parts, we obtain
Proposition 2 Assume that there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in both cases,
i.e. if the markets for spare parts are monopolized and if these markets are competitive.
With covered markets, i.e.
Di(￿) + Dj(￿) = const:;
total consumer expenditures are higher if markets for spare parts are monopolized.
Proof. We ￿rst derive the prices pi = e pi which lead to the same overall consumer
expenditures as pi = pc and e pi = e c(qi). Using (4) and the assumption that markets are
covered we thus start from a situation in which pi = e pi are equal to pk given by
pk = e c(qi) +
pc ￿ e c(qi)
1 + ￿ + 2￿(Xi(￿) + Xj(￿))
: (24)








= 2Xi(￿)2 > 0: (25)
10Therefore, starting with pi = e pi = pk both ￿rms would have an incentive to increase their
prices which also leads to higher consumer expenditures if the markets for spare parts
are monopolized.
Note that while proposition 2 is based on the assumption that markets are covered, the
strict inequality in (25) indicates that the result continues to hold if the di⁄erence between
j@Di(￿)/@mi(￿)j and @Di(￿)/@mj(￿) is positive but small enough. Thus, strictly positive
probabilities of causing accidents and liability obligations do not only imply that ￿rms
have an incentive to increase the prices for their spare parts, we also ￿nd that competition
in the markets for spare parts can decrease overall expenditures. Hence, monopolization
of markets for spare parts can indeed increase prices and may thus serve as a collusive
device.
5 Quality decisions
Turning to the ￿rst stage of the game, we again start with the case in which the markets
for spare parts are monopolized. Analyzing the impact of ￿ on the ￿rms￿qualities and
focusing on symmetric equilibria, comparative statics at ￿ = 0 show that the ￿rms may
choose even higher qualities if ￿ increases. This is the case as long as e c0(qi) is relatively low.
On the other hand, with competitive markets for spare parts ￿rms will always decrease
their qualities if ￿ is increased. Therefore, monopolized markets for spare parts tend to
lead to higher qualities as compared to the case in which spare parts are competitively
supplied.
Let ￿￿





i(qi;qj;￿)￿e c(qi))[￿Xi(￿) + ￿i(Xi(￿);Xj(￿))]: (26)














































￿e c0(qi)[￿Xi(￿) + ￿i(Xi(￿);Xj(￿))]















































for pi = pj and qi = qj. Combining (29) and (30) shows that while the shift in the ￿rms￿
market shares due to an increase of qi does not depend on ￿, a positive probability for
causing accidents tends to lower the positive e⁄ects of higher qualities on overall demand
(see (30)).
In view of (28) there are thus two opposing e⁄ects on the ￿rms￿incentives to invest in
qualities. While the term in the second line of (28) points to a positive e⁄ect, an increase
in ￿ decreases @Xi(￿)/@qi but does not imply any additional e⁄ects with respect to the
relation between the ￿rms￿qualities and their market shares. Evaluating these e⁄ects
more carefully, we obtain
Lemma 2 Assume that consumers￿demand functions Di(￿) are linear in mi and mj,
that markets are covered and that the markets for spare parts are monopolized. Assume
further that there exists a symmetric equilibrium in which both ￿rms choose the same
qualities q￿(￿;￿) = q￿








R 0 , c0(q￿(0;￿)) ￿ (2 + ￿)e c0(q￿(0;￿)) R 0
Proof. The proof is based on simple but tedious comparative statics. Using (3)￿ (8) and
(21) we get
p￿(qi;qj;￿)j￿=0 =
Xi(￿) ￿ (c(qi) + ￿e c(qi)) @Di(￿)/@mi(￿)

























2Xi(￿)[Xi(￿) ￿ (c(qi) ￿ e c(qi)) @Di(￿)/@mi(￿)]
(1 + ￿)2 @Di(￿)/@mi(￿)
(33)
Employing (31)￿ (33), totally di⁄erentiating (27) with respect to ￿ and evaluating the
respective expression at ￿ = 0 and q￿(0;￿) = q￿













4[c0(q￿(0;￿)) ￿ (2 + ￿)e c0(q￿(0;￿))]Xi(￿)2
3(1 + ￿)
(34)
The economic intuition for lemma 2 is based on two counteracting e⁄ects. On the one
hand, the higher ￿ the higher are the consumers￿total expected expenditures and the
lower their willingness to pay for additional quality enhancements. On the other hand, by
increasing its quality qi and adapting the prices for cars and spare parts correspondingly,
￿rm i gets an additional competitive advantage inasmuch as cars of type i become more
attractive while total expected expenditures mj(￿) increase as well. Lemma 2 shows that
this second e⁄ect dominates as long as long as e c0(qi) is small enough.
Turning to the case in which markets for spare parts are competitive, let ￿c￿
i (qi;qj)
denote the ￿rms￿reduced pro￿t functions. Using the same approach as in lemma 2 leads
to
Lemma 3 Assume that consumers￿demand functions Di(￿) are linear in mi and mj,
that markets are covered and that the markets for spare parts are competitive. Assume
further that there exists a symmetric equilibrium in which both ￿rms choose the same










Proof. Again, the proof is based on simple but tedious comparative statics. Employing


























Simplifying (35) shows that with ￿ = 0 the ￿rms would in fact choose the same qualities















13Additionally, assuming covered markets implies @pc(qi;qj;￿)/@￿ = 0. Using (23) and
(35), employing comparative statics with respect to ￿ and evaluating the respective ex-

















i (￿)2 < 0: (37)
Lemma 3 con￿rms the intuition provided for lemma 2. With competitive markets for spare
parts, the additional strategic e⁄ects implied by higher qualities and prices for cars and
spare parts are always dominated by the negative e⁄ects due to increased total expected
expenditures. Since the ￿rms cannot use the prices for spare parts in order to exploit the
negative e⁄ects on the other ￿rm￿ s demand, their willingness to invest in higher qualities
is lower the higher ￿. Summarizing these ￿ndings we get
Proposition 3 Assume that consumers￿demand functions Di(￿) are linear in mi and mj
and that markets are covered. Assume further that ￿ = 0 and that there exists a symmetric
equilibrium in which both ￿rms choose the same qualities. Then, an increase in ￿ implies
that the ￿rms￿incentive to exploit the external e⁄ects induced by liability obligations lead















Proof. Using c0(q) ￿ e c0(q) and comparing (34) and (37) leads to the result.
Propositions 1￿ 3 show that the relation between prices for cars and spare parts is not
neutral with respect to the equilibrium allocation. Monopolized markets for spare parts
tend to imply higher overall expenditures and stronger incentives for providing higher
qualities. Considering social welfare, it is, however, not clear whether or not monopolized
markets for spare parts are detrimental for welfare. On the one hand, high overall expendi-
tures tend to lower welfare. On the other hand, positive probabilities of causing accidents
and the implied negative externalities lead to ine¢ cient consumer decisions. Similarly,
while high qualities of cars are bene￿cial for consumers, high qualities also tend to raise
the expected costs due to accidents caused. In order to evaluate these countervailing
e⁄ects, we will now turn to two simple examples.
146 Examples
The ￿rst example is based on a Hotelling model with covered markets. It mainly illustrates
the results presented in the preceding section and shows that while ￿rms are strictly better
o⁄ with monopolized markets for spare parts, social welfare is higher with competitive
markets. The second example is more involved inasmuch as it builds on uncovered markets
where consumers are assumed to have a Dixit utility function. In contrast to the Hotelling
model it turns out that ￿rms may be better o⁄ with competitive markets for spare
parts. While monopolized markets for spare parts again lead to higher expenditures
for the consumers, the implied increase in the ￿rms￿pro￿ts is the lower the lower the
substitutability between the ￿rms￿products. Moreover, equilibrium qualities continue to
be higher with monopolized markets for spare parts which may ultimately lead to lower
pro￿ts as compared to the case with competitive markets.
6.1 Covered markets
Following the standard Hotelling model, we assume that consumers are uniformly distrib-
uted on the [0;1] interval. The mass of consumers is normalized to one. Let ￿ denote a
consumer￿ s location and let ￿rm 1 be located at 0 and ￿rm 2 at 1. Assuming linear trans-






v(q1) ￿ m1(￿) ￿ t￿ if he buys from ￿rm 1
v(q2) ￿ m2(￿) ￿ t(1 ￿ ￿) if he buys from ￿rm 2
(38)
with : v0(q) > 0 and v00(q) ￿ 0
With respect to the ￿rms￿cost, we rely on the general assumptions c0(qi);e c0(qi) > 0 and
c00(qi);e c00(qi) > 0 as well as c(qi) > e c(qi) and c0(qi) > e c0(qi).
Using (38), solving for the indi⁄erent consumer and taking into account that m1(￿) and




[v(q1) ￿ v(q2) ￿ (p1 ￿ p2) ￿ (e p1 ￿ e p2)(￿ + ￿) + t] (39)
X2(￿) = 1 ￿ X1(￿) (40)
Starting with the case of monopolized markets, it is easy to verify that both ￿rms will
in fact choose pi = e pi. Furthermore, solving @￿i(￿)/@pi = 0 for the equilibrium prices
15p￿
i(qi;qj;￿) and di⁄erentiating the reduced pro￿t functions ￿￿
i(￿) with respect to qi, it is
straightforward to show that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium p￿(￿) and q￿(￿;￿)
implicitly given by
pi = e c(qi) +
c(qi) ￿ e c(qi)
1 + ￿ + 2￿
+
t
1 + ￿ + ￿
and (41)
c0(qi) = ￿e c0(qi)(￿ + 2￿) +
(1 + ￿ + 2￿)
1 + ￿ + ￿
v0(qi) (42)





[v(q1) ￿ v(q2) ￿ (p1 ￿ p2) ￿ (e c(q1) ￿ e c(q2))(￿ + ￿) + t] (43)
Xc
2(￿) = 1 ￿ Xc
1(￿) (44)
Again, maximizing the ￿rms￿pro￿t functions ￿c
i(￿) with respect to the ￿rms￿prices and
di⁄erentiating the reduced pro￿t functions with respect to the ￿rms￿qualities, the unique
symmetric equilibrium pc(￿) and qc(￿;￿) is implicitly given by
pi = c(qi) + t and (45)
c0(qi) = ￿e c0(qi)(￿ + ￿) + v0(qi) (46)
Comparing (42) and (46) and using simple comparative statics leads to q￿(￿;￿) > qc(￿;￿)
for all ￿ > 0. Furthermore, (41) and (45) reveal that the ￿rms￿pro￿ts are strictly higher
with monopolized markets for spare parts:
￿￿
i(q￿(￿;￿);￿) =
1 + ￿ + 2￿





i (qc(￿;￿);￿) 8 ￿ > 0 (47)


























￿e c0(qc) < 0 (49)
Inequality (49) together with q￿(￿;￿) > qc(￿;￿) implies that social welfare is lower with
monopolized markets for spare parts as compared to the case in which spare parts can
be supplied competitively.
166.2 Uncovered markets
In contrast to the Hotelling model we now assume that markets are not covered. We
assume that there is a continuum of homogeneous consumers the number of which is
normalized to 1. Consumers have a Dixit utility function given by




1 + 2￿x1x2 + x2
2) ￿ m1(￿)x1 ￿ m2(￿)x2 (50)
where ￿ 2 [0;1) measures the degree of substitutability between the ￿rms￿cars. The
￿rms￿marginal costs are given by
c(qi) = caq2
i and e c(qi) = csq2
i (51)
Maximizing (50) with respect to xi (i = 1;2) and assuming interior solutions leads to
xi(qi;qj;mi(￿);mj(￿)) =
1
1 ￿ ￿2 [qi ￿ mi(￿) ￿ ￿(qj ￿ mj(￿))] (52)
To simplify the analysis further, let ￿ = 0. Then, expected overall expenditures mi(￿) can
be written as
mi(￿) = pi + 2￿e pixi + (e pi + e pj)￿xj: (53)
Solving the system of equations implied by (52) and (53), ￿rms￿market demands with
pi = e pi are given by
Xi(￿) =
qi(1 + 2￿pj) + (pj ￿ qj)(￿ + ￿pj) ￿ pi [1 + ￿(pj + qj)]
1 ￿ ￿ [￿(pi ￿ pj)2 ￿ 2(pi + pj)] ￿ ￿[￿ + 2￿(pi + pj)]
(54)
Using (54) and focusing on symmetric equilibria, (21) and (32) together with the assump-
tions on the ￿rms￿costs lead to
p￿(q￿(0;￿);￿) =
















R 0 , ca R
8 ￿ (5 ￿ ￿)￿2
2 + ￿ ￿ 3￿2 + 2￿3cs (56)
Since (8￿(5￿￿)￿2)=(2+￿￿3￿2+2￿3) is strictly decreasing in ￿, (56) indicates that the
￿rms￿incentives to increase their qualities are decreased if the probability of accidents
caused raises when markets are uncovered and competition becomes less intense, i.e. when
￿ decreases.
Turning to the case of competitive markets for spare parts we obviously get pc(qc(0;￿);￿) =












(6 ￿ ￿(1 + ￿)2)cs
8(2 ￿ ￿)3(1 + ￿)2(2 + ￿)ca
< 0 (57)
17Hence, with competitive markets for spare parts ￿rms unambiguously reduce their qual-
ities if the probability of accidents caused and thus the consumers￿overall expenditures
increase.
Evaluating the impact of these di⁄erent comparative static results on the ￿rms￿pro￿ts
and overall welfare, consider ￿rst the special case with rather low costs for spare parts,
i.e.,
cs := ￿ca with ￿ = 0:1 (58)
Solving for the equilibrium prices and quantities, it turns out that there exists a unique
symmetric equilibrium. Figure 1 assumes ￿ = 0:2 and shows the graphs for q￿(￿;￿) and
qc(￿;￿) as well as the di⁄erences between the ￿rms￿pro￿ts, ￿￿
i(q￿(￿);￿;￿)￿￿c￿
i (qc(￿);￿;￿),
and between social welfare, W￿(q￿(￿);￿;￿)￿Wc(qc(￿);￿;￿) (W￿(q￿(￿);￿;￿) denotes social
welfare with monopolized markets for spare parts).
Figure 1: Qualities, pro￿ts and social welfare with ￿ = 0:2 and ￿ = 0:1
Figure 1 indicates that the comparative static results derived for covered markets continue
to hold in this example. Furthermore, monopolization leads to higher equilibrium pro￿ts
as long as ￿ is not too high. Although higher qualities tend to reduce the ￿rms￿pro￿ts, the
positive e⁄ect from the increase in overall consumer expenditures dominates if ￿ is rather
low. This result is reversed when ￿ is high enough. Then, the ￿rms￿incentives to exploit
18the external e⁄ects by choosing higher qualities are such that their equilibrium pro￿ts are
lower as compared to the case with competitive markets for spare parts. Finally, ￿gure 1
also reveals that social welfare is always lower with monopolized markets for spare parts.
The increase in overall expenditures under monopolization as well as the higher qualities
reduce social welfare unambiguously.
The last result does not hold if the degree of substitutability between the ￿rms￿products is
high. Figure 2 shows the critical values ￿W(￿;￿) and ￿￿(￿;￿) at which social welfare and
the ￿rms￿pro￿ts are the same with monopolized and competitive markets for spare parts.
More precisely, with ￿ = 0:2 we have W￿(q￿(￿;￿);￿) < Wc(qc(￿;￿);￿) (￿￿(q￿(￿;￿);￿) <
￿c￿(qc(￿;￿);￿)) for all (￿;￿) with ￿ > ￿W(￿;￿) (￿ > ￿￿(￿;￿)). With ￿ = 0:5 we obtain
W￿(q￿(￿;￿);￿) < Wc(qc(￿;￿);￿) for all (￿;￿) > 0 and ￿￿(q￿(￿;￿);￿) > ￿c￿(qc(￿;￿);￿)
for all (￿;￿) with ￿ < ￿￿(￿;￿).
Figure 2: Comparison of pro￿ts and social welfare for low and high costs for spare parts
To give an intuitive explanation for these results, consider ￿rst the case of relatively low
costs for spare parts, i.e., ￿ = 0:2. In this case monopolization can be bene￿cial for social
welfare because i) high values of ￿ imply that competition between the ￿rms is rather
￿erce and ii) consumers do not internalize the negative external e⁄ects they impose
19on other consumers when they decide to buy a car. Therefore, an increase in overall
expenditures due to monopolized markets for spare parts can in fact lead to higher social
welfare. On the other hand, with relatively high costs for spare parts, monopolization is
always detrimental for social welfare because higher qualities lead to signi￿cantly higher
costs and overall expenditures for consumers. Turning to the ￿rms￿pro￿ts and again
starting with ￿ = 0:2, note ￿rst that high values of ￿ lead to rather strong incentives for
the ￿rms to invest in their qualities. Hence, ￿rms￿pro￿ts may be higher with competitive
markets if ￿ is high. With relatively high costs for spare parts, i.e., ￿ = 0:5, monopolized
markets for spare parts are bene￿cial for the ￿rms as long as the relation between the
degree of substitutability and the probability for accidents caused is high enough. The
intuition for this ￿nding is based on the fact that the higher the costs for spare parts the
lower are the ￿rms￿incentives to increase their qualities.
7 Conclusion
The results presented in the last section clearly indicate that monopolization of markets
for spare parts can be detrimental for social welfare. Positive probabilities of causing
accidents together with liability obligations imply that high prices for spare parts do not
only harm the ￿rms￿own consumers but also the consumers of other ￿rms. The relation
between the prices for the ￿rms￿cars and the respective spare parts is not neutral with
respect to the ￿rms￿market shares. By choosing a relatively high price for spare parts
but a relatively low price for cars each ￿rm can increase its own market share without
decreasing its overall revenues. Hence, the ￿rms￿incentives to choose high prices are
stronger with monopolized markets for spare parts compared to the case in which these
markets are competitive. Ultimately, competition is weakened and the ￿rms￿pro￿ts tend
to be higher with monopolized markets for spare parts.
While endogenous quality decisions can imply that the ￿rms￿pro￿ts are higher with com-
petitive markets for spare parts, covered markets and relatively high costs for spare parts
ensure that ￿rms are better o⁄ with monopolized markets. Considering social welfare,
an increase in overall expenditures may serve as a mechanism to get socially more e¢ -
cient consumption decisions. However, our examples have shown that the overall e⁄ects
implied by monopolized markets for spare parts reduce social welfare for a broad range
20of parameter values. This is especially true if markets are covered or the costs for spare
parts are relatively high.
Although these results are based on a rather simple model, the underlying reasoning
should continue to hold under more general assumptions. Most obviously, considering
the possibility that consumers can refrain from repairing damaged cars would alter the
demand for spare parts but would not lead to other conclusions with respect to the
external e⁄ects implied by accidents caused and liability obligations. While a consumer
can decide not to repair his own car, he has to pay the damage caused to other consumers.
Hence, the relation between the prices for cars and spare parts would not be neutral
with respect to the ￿rms￿market shares and the ￿rms would again have an incentive
to increase the relative price of their spare parts. Similarly, while analyzing risk averse
consumers and their demand for liability insurance would lead to a more complicated
model, it would not alter the ￿rms￿pricing strategies. Since insurance rates are positively
correlated with expected payments for accidents caused the basic strategic e⁄ects implied
by high prices for spare parts and low prices for cars would continue to hold in a model
which incorporates liability insurances.
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